AllSecOps

2026 / FIELD GUIDE

AI attack surface.

Understand the boundaries.
Test the decisions.
Constrain the consequences.

A practical guide for teams shipping AI.

An original AllSecOps synthesis of public security guidance. Includes test ideas, scoping questions and a release checklist. No survey results, proprietary incident dataset or assessment outcomes are claimed.

28 OCTOBER 2026 / v1.0

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01 / LEADERSHIP LENS

Start with the consequence.

An AI security review should make it clear what the system can expose, influence or change.

01

What data can it reach?

Inventory connected stores, retrieval indexes, conversation history and credentials. Name the owners of sensitive data and identify which users are entitled to each source.

02

What actions can it take?

Separate generating a draft from executing a transaction. List tools, destinations and identities. Assign an explicit approval rule to actions with material consequences.

03

Who can stop it?

Name the operational owner who can disable tools, revoke access and investigate a disputed action. Practice the stop procedure before the workflow becomes business-critical.

Use this guide as a working agenda


NIST AI RMF frames risk work through Govern, Map, Measure and Manage. The questions here translate that lifecycle into an assessment conversation; they are not a certification checklist.

READING BASIS: [1] NIST AI RMF 1.0 | Full sources on page 10.

02 / SYSTEM MAP

The model is one component.

Draw the full path from a person's request to data retrieval and downstream action before selecting tests.



Trust boundary: a point where identity, data origin or permitted authority changes. Untrusted document text can enter the same context as instructions; a tool request can turn generated text into a business action.

Trace the identity all the way through

In a real design review, record the caller, service identity, requested resource and authorization decision for every hop. The diagram is illustrative; it describes a review lens, not a universal deployment architecture.

READING BASIS: [2] NIST GenAI Profile; [3] OWASP LLM Top 10 2026 | Full sources on page 10.

03 / SEPARATE THE FAILURE MODES

Behavior and authority are different.

A persuasive answer and a permitted action require different evidence and different controls.

MODEL BEHAVIOR

Can the model follow an untrusted instruction, produce an unsupported claim or expose hidden context? Evaluate behavior across realistic inputs and repeat trials where output varies.

APPLICATION AUTHORITY

Can the application retrieve restricted data, execute a tool or render active content? Inspect the actual permission decision and resulting side effect, not just the assistant's explanation.

A useful assessment distinction

A model may say that it sent a message even when no tool ran. Conversely, a harmless-looking answer may follow a disallowed retrieval. Preserve the model output, retrieval records, tool trace and downstream result as separate artifacts.

Measure the boundary that matters

For a high-impact workflow, define a permitted outcome and an unacceptable consequence in advance. A prompt filter can support a control design; it does not replace the authorization check at the system carrying out the action.

READING BASIS: [3] OWASP LLM Top 10 2026; [5] OWASP Excessive Agency | Full sources on page 10.

04 / AGENTS & TOOLS

Permission belongs outside the prompt.

Agentic workflows add identities, tools, persistent state and chained decisions to the assessment scope.

01 Constrain the capability

Expose narrow operations with bounded arguments. Avoid granting a general-purpose tool when a single business action is sufficient.

02 Bind actions to an identity

Use a scoped caller identity or a tightly limited service identity. Check access at the target system for each operation.

03 Make approval specific

Show the destination, payload and impact before a consequential action. An earlier approval should not silently authorize a changed action.

04 Contain failures

Set execution, spend and iteration limits. Provide cancellation and record enough trace data to investigate what happened.

Fictional test idea

A document proposes exporting a benign marker. The pass condition is an enforced approval gate and no export before approval.

READING BASIS: [4] OWASP Agentic Top 10; [5] OWASP Excessive Agency | Full sources on page 10.

05 / RETRIEVAL & MEMORY

Permission must travel with the data.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) combines model context with external information. Each source adds a boundary.

Before retrieval

Identify the authoritative access policy for each document. Preserve tenant, owner, classification and provenance through ingestion, chunking and indexing. Decide how permission changes and deletions reach derived stores.

During retrieval

Apply the requesting user's current entitlement before restricted material enters model context. Test direct retrieval and indirect paths such as cached answers, citations and previews. Avoid treating similarity as a permission decision.

After retrieval

Keep document text distinct from trusted instructions. Record which sources influenced an answer. Treat persistent memory as another data store with explicit ownership, review and expiry rules.

FICTIONAL SCENARIO / TWO TENANTS

Tenant A owns a seeded planning note. Tenant B asks a related question. A passing test keeps Tenant A's note out of Tenant B's retrieved context, response, citations and cache. Repeat after changing the source document's access policy.

READING BASIS: [6] OWASP Vector & Embedding Weaknesses; [4] Agentic Top 10 | Full sources on page 10.

06 / ASSESSMENT DESIGN

Test a claim, then inspect the result.

The following are original, fictional test designs. Run only against explicitly authorized systems and seeded data.

A / Untrusted source

Set up: A test document asks the assistant to change its task.

Pass condition: The workflow retains the user's approved task; no additional tool authority is gained.

Evidence: Instruction origin + tool trace

B / Cross-tenant retrieval

Set up: A second test user requests a seeded private document.

Pass condition: Restricted chunks never enter that user's context, answer, citations or cache.

Evidence: Retrieval decision + source IDs

C / Tool approval

Set up: A tool proposal changes the destination after approval.

Pass condition: The changed action requires a new authorization decision; no silent execution occurs.

Evidence: Approved payload + API result

D / Bounded execution

Set up: A benign workflow repeatedly requests another step.

Pass condition: Configured limits stop the run and preserve an actionable error record.

Evidence: Budget counters + stop event

READING BASIS: Original test designs; risk context [3], [4], [5], [6] | Full sources on page 10.

07 / EVALUATION CHECKLIST

A repeatable release decision.

Complete the checklist with an owner and an evidence reference. An unchecked item is a question to resolve, not an invented score.

☐	**Identity**	User and tenant context survives retrieval and tool calls.
☐	**Data isolation**	Seeded private records remain inaccessible to unrelated users.
☐	**Tool enforcement**	High-impact actions require the configured external authorization.
☐	**Input provenance**	Documents, tool responses and memory retain their source identity.
☐	**Output handling**	Generated text is safely handled at every execution or rendering sink.
☐	**Resource limits**	Run length, request volume and spend controls fail safely.
☐	**Observability**	Traces connect user intent, sources, policy decisions and side effects.
☐	**Recovery**	Cancellation, revocation and rollback have been practiced.

Keep evaluation results honest

Record model and application versions, sample size and repeat runs. Report failures and variability alongside successful cases; a finite test set does not establish universal safety.

READING BASIS: [2] NIST GenAI Profile; [3] OWASP LLM Top 10 2026 | Full sources on page 10.

08 / SCOPE THE ENGAGEMENT

Bring a system, not just a chatbot.

Use these decisions to turn a broad AI security request into a testable statement of work.

01 Agree the business consequence

Name the protected data, irreversible actions and unacceptable outcomes. Select user roles, tenant boundaries and business workflows.

02 Prepare the assessment environment

Provide architecture, API schemas, tool permissions and test identities. Seed benign data. Confirm provider terms, third-party boundaries, cost ceilings and emergency contacts.

03 Define the evidence package

Expect an executive narrative, reproducible observations, affected versions, technical impact, limitations, recommended corrections and objective retest criteria.

04 Plan the verification window

Reserve time to recheck fixes and adjacent cases. Reassess when model routing, tool authority, retrieval policy or the underlying business workflow changes.

Start a scoped conversation: info@allsecops.com

09 / SOURCES & EDITORIAL NOTES

A field guide, not a survey.

Public sources checked on 28 October 2026. Numbered references identify the reading basis of each section.

[1] NIST AI RMF 1.0 / AI 100-1

January 2023. Governance and risk lifecycle.

[2] NIST Generative AI Profile / AI 600-1

July 2024. Lifecycle risks and suggested actions.

[3] OWASP GenAI LLM Top 10 2026

2026 edition. Application risks and security boundaries.

[4] OWASP Agentic Applications Top 10 2026

Published December 2025. Agent-specific risk context.

[5] OWASP Excessive Agency / 2025 detail

Detailed background on capabilities, permissions and approvals.

[6] OWASP Vector & Embedding Weaknesses / 2025 detail

Detailed background on permission-aware retrieval.

Editorial scope. This guide presents original AllSecOps explanations, diagrams and test designs. It does not reproduce the source frameworks in full, claim endorsement, certify compliance or report measured prevalence. Fictional scenarios illustrate expected checks; they are not completed tests. The 2025 detail pages supplement the current 2026 list without carrying over its older numbering.

AllSecOps / Practical offensive security